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المراجع	IOR/L/PS/18/B225
العنوان	رسالة من المقدم وليام جورج جراي في الجيش الهندي، الوكيل السياسي في الكويت إلى السير آرثر هيرتزل، سكرتير الإدارة السياسية في مكتب الهند
التاريخ/ التواريخ	١٦ يونيو ١٩١٥ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية في اللاتينية
الحجم والشكل	ورقتان
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>رخصة حكومة مفتوحة</u>

حول هذا السجل

الرسالة من المقدم وليام جورج جراي إلى السير فريدريك آرثر هيرتزل مرفقة بنسخة عن الرسالة رقم سنة ١٩١٥ بقلم جراي، بوصفه الوكيل السياسي في الكويت، إلى المقيم السياسي في الخليج C/8 العربي، المؤرخة في ٠٩ يونيو ١٩١٥، فيما يتعلق بالتعاون العربي مع الأتراك في دولة شط العرب.


تشير الرسالة إلى كل من التصريحات التي أدلى بها اللورد كورزون من كيدلستون في مجلس اللوردات وتصريحاته التي تتصل بخطاب ألقاه السيد ب. لاندون بشأن البصرة وشط العرب في جمعية الفنون في أبريل ١٩١٥. تتعلق التصريحات بالقبائل العربية المؤيدة للأتراك، وتصريحات أخرى أدلى بها وزير الدولة لشؤون الهند بشأن معركة الشعبية، حيث أفيد فيما يخصها أن حوالي ١٠,٠٠٠ مقاتل عربي كانوا قد انضموا إلى القوات التركية. وتثير الرسالة أيضاً مسألة دواعي وقوفهم الآن مع الأتراك بالرغم من علاقاتهم السابقة مع بريطانيا.

يتضمن رد جراي على هذه التصريحات توضيحاً مفصلاً بأن تكوين القبائل المشاركة هو بشكل رئيسي من المجتمعات العربية في العراق، وقبيلة المنتفق في مناطق الفرات وشط الغراف [المعروف أيضاً باسم شط الحي]. ويشير رده كذلك إلى أن القبائل المشاركة ليست قبائل منطقة الخليج العربي كما ادعى سابقاً اللورد كورزون.

وتمضي الرسالة في توضيح علاقات هذه القبائل مع الأتراك وأسباب وقوفها معهم. وتختتم الرسالة بتقديم معلومات عن بعض قبائل الخليج العربي، وخاصة قبيلة الظافر التي كانت قد رفضت دعوات تركية لها بحمل السلاح، وقبائل يوارين وبني مالك وشمّر التي كانت قد اختارت جميعها الوقوف على الحياد.



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[٢٦ و] (٤/١)



CONFIDENTIAL.

LETTER from Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, Indian Army, Political Agent,
Kuwait, to the Secretary, Political Department, India Office.

Dear Sir Arthur Hirtzel,

Political Agency, Kuwait,
16th June 1915.

The enclosed is perhaps important, or interesting enough to send to you direct in view of the time which correspondence takes to reach the India Office, particularly now that the mail journey from India is extended by a week. The position has materially improved during the past few days; the waverers among Arabs are more soundly converted to us by our success than by any other form of persuasion.

Yours very truly,
W. G. GREY.

From Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. Grey, Indian Army, Political Agent, Kuwait,
to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Bushire, No. C/8 of 1915,
dated Political Agency, Kuwait, 9th June 1915.

Sir,

According to the *Times*, Lord Curzon of Kedleston is reported to have remarked as follows on the occasion of an address by Mr. P. Landon on Basrah and the Shatt-ul-Arab, at the Society of Arts, on 15th April last:—

"Hitherto we had had most friendly relations with the Arabs. It was rather a puzzle to him why at those earlier stages of the fighting the Arabs appeared to have sided with the Turks, and it certainly should be the object of our diplomacy to detach them from the side of the Turks and to resume those pleasant relations with them which had characterized our policy during the last 50 years."

And again in the House of Lords on 20th April:—

"And they (the Turks) appeared to have succeeded in pressing into their service the greater part of the Arab tribes in the lower part of Mesopotamia. This was a matter of extreme importance, for we had always maintained, and he thought were still maintaining, friendly relations with the tribes in that part of the world."

The Right Honourable the Secretary of State for India is reported to have replied on the latter occasion that:—

"A considerable number of Arabs had joined the Turks in the attacks. At the battle of Shaiba, where there were certainly not less than 10,000 Turkish troops engaged, probably approaching the same number of Arabs took part in the operations. It had been perhaps too hastily assumed at first that all Arabs, when Turkey joined the Germans, would take part in breaking the Turkish yoke. Of some Arabs, particularly many of the desert tribes, this was no doubt true. How far it applied to the more sedentary Arabs who, he took it, supplied the Arab forces now operating, it was not so easy to say. It was reasonable to suppose that probably a considerable number had proved willing to join Turkey now because they had had it

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dinned into their ears that Islam was being attacked. Some of them might even believe the amazing stories that were told about the conversion to Islam of eminent Germans, including the Emperor himself."

I have the honour to submit a few notes of information which I have collected regarding the extent to which the Arabs have co-operated with the Turks in the Shatt-ul-Arab country; the considerations which have led them to co-operate, and the results to themselves and to the Turks of such co-operation; with some remarks upon the position of those Arab tribes which have held aloof or tacitly sided with His Majesty's Government.


2. The Arab forces which took part in the recent operations in the neighbourhood of Shaiba were composed mainly of 4,000 members of various communities from Iraq and 6,000 of the Muntafik tribes from the country lying on the banks of the Euphrates and the Shatt-ul-Gharaf between Khamisiah on the south and Kut-ul-Amarah on the north. The only other Arabs who appear to have helped the Turks on this occasion are a few hundred men of the Bani Hakam and the Bani Hasan who inhabit the swampy region adjoining Sukh-us-Shiyukh.

3. The Iraqis have had very little connection with us, and dwell too far away ever to have come under the influence of our Persian Gulf officials. The Resident at Baghdad has in all probability had little opportunity of cultivating their friendship or of making his influence felt amongst them, and no astonishment need be expressed at their having joined the Turks, which was natural. Of the Muntafik much the same may be said. Their country nowhere touches upon Persian Gulf administrative limits, and I learn that no decided efforts have ever been made by His Majesty's Consuls at Basrah to establish friendly relations with them; in fact, they probably did not consider such a proceeding to be part of their duty, as it would have been regarded by the Turks with grave suspicion if not with resentment. It may also be remembered that the Muntafik land lies in the direct route of Turkish troops advancing on Basrah from Baghdad and in districts which have for centuries been governed or misgoverned by Ottoman officials. It would have been strange indeed had they elected to oppose the Turkish forces with, so far as they could see, everything to lose and nothing to gain thereby. The small tribes west of Basrah mentioned above, who know little of the British, were bribed or forced to give what help they could like the Basrahis, numbers of whom had been compelled some months earlier to join in opposing our first advance, on pain of destruction of their lives and property and those of their relatives.

4. The conduct of the Iraqis seems to have been correct from the Turkish point of view, except that they occasionally displayed a lack of discipline and perhaps courage. But in the course of the engagements of April 12-15, the Muntafik showed clearly that their hearts were not in the struggle from any national or religious enthusiasm, but that while motives of self-preservation had led the chiefs to take up arms, the common people were out for plunder from whomsoever it might be taken. On 13th April these same Muntafik plundered the Turkish encampment during their retreat after being repulsed by our troops, the ostensible reason, according to



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[٢٧ و] (٤/٣)





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[٢٧ ظ] (٤/٤)

